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EU Actorness in International Aﬀairs:
The Case of EULEX Mission in Kosovo
LABINOT GREIC¸EVCI
Faculty of Political Sciences, Universiteit Gent, Belgium
ABSTRACT This article discusses one of the missions of the European Union Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP) and, so far, the biggest EU mission in the area of conﬂict management:
the rule of law mission in Kosovo, dubbed EULEX Kosovo. Its conceptual framework is built on
the EU’s international role and notably on the EU actorness thesis. The article explores several
important aspects of the EULEX mission in Kosovo. In doing so, it looks at the following issues:
(a) the ﬁrst instance of the EULEXmission based on the comprehensive Ahtisaari proposal for the
future status of Kosovo; (b) the launch of EULEX and, through this, EU cohesion in the mission
itself; (c) the diﬃcult process of EULEX deployment in Kosovo, which resulted in a ‘compromised
authority’ and ‘ambiguous recognition’ of the mission itself; and (d) EULEX autonomy in view of
its relations with other international actors (notably UNMIK) and other EU entities involved in
Kosovo. In addition, the article examines the implications that the handicapped actorness of
EULEX might have for its current and future input, through analyzing brieﬂy the initial results
and failures of EULEX in Kosovo. Thus, the article examines the process of establishing EULEX
in Kosovo and sheds light on the EU’s policies in Kosovo and in the western Balkans.
KEY WORDS: EULEX mission, Kosovo, EU’s international role, EU actorness
I. Introduction
The European Union’s role in international aﬀairs has evolved substantially in
recent years. In essence, its developing international relations include the processes
of state-building, conﬂict management, and peacekeeping missions. One of the
missions of the European Union, set in the context of the European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP) and so far the biggest EU mission in the area of conﬂict
management, is the rule of law mission in Kosovo, dubbed EULEX Kosovo. The
purpose of this article is to analyze several important aspects and dimensions of the
EULEX mission in Kosovo. In addition, this article tackles brieﬂy the remainder of
the EU agencies in Kosovo.
Hence, the ﬁrst part of this article addresses the conceptual framework through a
short consideration of the EU’s international role and elaborates on this as it relates
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to the EU actorness thesis. The second part is concerned with the ﬁrst instance of
the EULEX mission based on the comprehensive Ahtisaari proposal for the
future status of Kosovo. Additionally, this part discusses the launch of EULEX and,
through this, EU cohesion in the mission itself. The next part discusses and
elaborates the diﬃcult process of EULEX deployment in Kosovo, which resulted
in a compromised authority and ambiguous recognition of the mission itself. This
section also discusses EULEX autonomy in view of its relations with other
international actors, notably the United Nations Interim Administration Mission
in Kosovo (UNMIK) as well as its relations with other EU entities involved in
Kosovo.
In addition, in line with these components of EU actorness, the article scrutinizes
the implications that the handicapped actorness of EULEX might have for its current
and future inﬂuence, through analyzing brieﬂy the initial results and failures of
EULEX in Kosovo. Finally, the last part points out the empirical ﬁndings with
regard to the conceptual framework set out at the beginning of this article.
II. The EU’s International Role
Since the formation of European Union its member states have tried through various
initiatives and mechanisms over diﬀerent periods to unify their policies on a range of
matters in the international arena. However, considering the complexity of the EU as
a political entity, in a majority of these cases they achieved consensus only at the
level of satisfying the lowest common denominator.
For instance, as Filtenborg et al. (2002, p. 391) claim, ‘during the Cold War
period, the European Community (EC) abstained from developing any common
policies towards its Northern and Eastern periphery owing to the constraints
imposed by the bipolarity of the world system’. In fact, the ‘neutrality’ of the
European Community in terms of foreign policy lasted more or less until 1992. Then,
as Ginsberg (1999, p. 430) asserts, ‘by trumpeting a new Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) for the EU in the Maastricht Treaty (1993), the EU raised
expectations for a collective diplomacy’. Moreover, ‘in December 1998, France and
the United Kingdom released a joint declaration at St. Malo calling for the EU to
possess the power of autonomous action and the appropriate military resources, a
groundbreaking step forward’ (Algieri, 2006–2007, p. 109). Consequently, this kind
of philosophy followed the decision of the Cologne European Council in June 1999
to develop the European Security and Defence Policy as a part of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy. In other words, as Keukeleire (2003, p. 37) underlines,
‘the member states decided in Cologne that the Union must have the capacity for
autonomous action backed up by credible military force, . . . and the readiness to act
in order to respond to international crises’.
As the above discussion shows, the European Union in recent years and notably
since the Maastricht Treaty (1993) has created various mechanisms such as CFSP
and ESDP as a result of deepening and widening processes within EU. Similarly, for
the ﬁrst time, the EU appointed a High Representative of the CFSP, who in a sense
is a symbol of the EU’s member states’ commitment to a common foreign and
security policy. Ultimately, it is assumed that the intention of the EU decision
makers with all of these new mechanisms has been to make the EU a more consistent
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actor in international relations and to strengthen its role and inﬂuence in the
international arena.
The EU deployed several missions in diﬀerent parts of the world, starting in the
Balkans – Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Kosovo – and spread to the missions in Chad, Darfur, and the
Congo. It is clear that with such a signiﬁcant presence in so many countries, other
actors cannot neglect the EU’s presence in international relations.
Nevertheless, as Smith (2008, p. 25) emphasizes ‘the EU is not always able to
translate presence into ‘‘actorness’’, that is, the ability to function actively and
deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system’. In addition, he
claims that ‘the EU member states and institutions must be able to agree on external
actions, maintain those positions, and mobilize the resources necessary to pursue
them’ (ibid.). Similarly, Maull (2005, p. 791) suggests, ‘[that]a truly common foreign
and security policy, . . . requires that national and European policies . . . be
eﬀectively aligned around the same objectives, and that all available resources . . . be
channelled into their realization’. However, as the practice of international aﬀairs
has shown, the EU is not always a uniﬁed actor over various issues.
Moreover, Smith (2008, p. 27) suggests that ‘the tension between the drive to act
collectively on the world stage and the desire to retain national autonomy has shaped
the institutions . . . , as well as the outcomes produced by them’. For instance, these
types of conﬂicts appear at the UN, chieﬂy by the desire of EU member states to act
independently at this international organization (Smith, 2006). In essence, this is also
related to the claim of Maull (2005, p. 791), who argues that ‘the EU is . . . a complex
political entity . . . of sovereign nation-states and . . . foreign and security policies
represent powerful bastions of national sovereignty, and are therefore, particularly
diﬃcult to transform into truly supranational ‘‘common’’ policies’.
Furthermore, regarding division in the EU foreign policy on these various issues,
Gray & Hart (1998, p. 3) has pointed out ‘the impotence of established and emerging
institutions of the European Union to prevent civil war in the former Yugoslavia, or
handle its consequences’. In this sense, Van Selm-Thorburn and Verbeek (1998, p.
175) argue that ‘it has often been claimed that this Yugoslav crisis provided a
concrete and perversely ‘‘ideal’’ opportunity . . . of a common European foreign
policy’. Moreover, Luxembourg foreign Minister, Jacques Poes in 1991 famously
stated that the crisis in Yugoslavia is ‘the hour of Europe not the hour of US’.
Nevertheless, unfortunately the European Union failed to manifest its ability in this
case. In fact, it was not the hour of Europe but might more properly have been
considered the hour of the US in that it was United States’ initiative and leadership,
(and not that of the EU) which managed to intervene and to solve in a way all the
conﬂicts that emerged from the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Similarly,
another failure of the EU’s foreign policy, as Gordon mentions (1997/1998, p. 88), is
‘Italy’s April 1997 decision to organize a peace enforcement mission to Albania
outside the context of either the EU or WEU, because of a lack of consensus or
ability to compel joint action in those organizations’. Some additional fresh
examples of failure of the EU foreign policy are the following: ‘its inability to end
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo without the assistance of the United States, the
unresolved policy towards the Israeli–Palestinian conﬂict and the political rift
between particularly the larger EU Member States on the war in Iraq’ (Groenleer &
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Van Schaik, 2007, pp. 969–970). In addition to this, as Peterson and Smith (2003, p.
213) maintain, ‘the EU cannot realize its external ambitions without agreeing on
division of labour with a range of other international organizations, including the
United Nations, NATO, the OSCE, the WTO, and others’ (also including the US).
Indeed, as the above discussion pointed out, without the initiative and leadership of
the US (notably in conﬂicts involving the former Yugoslavia), EU common foreign
policy would be a ﬁasco.
In brief, this discussion highlights the divisions that existed and continue to exist
between EU member states in relation to EU foreign policy, particularly in regard to
Kosovo and the former Yugoslavia. To this end, we have given several examples of
the EU’s failure to act as a uniﬁed actor in international aﬀairs. Various theoretical
approaches have analyzed this phenomenon through a number of diﬀerent
viewpoints and perspectives. The current article evaluates this overall situation in
light of the concept of EU actorness.
II.1 EU Actorness Thesis
In order to conceptualize EU actorness, this article will elaborate essentially on the
approach developed by Jupille and Caporaso (1998). In addition to this, we will focus
on the relationship that exists between the work of Jupille and Caporaso,
and Bretherton and Vogler (1999, 2006) and other scholars on the issue of EU
actorness.
In essence, Jupille and Caporaso (1998) highlight four components of actor
capacity in global politics: recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion. For
instance, regarding recognition they point out that ‘recognition [is] understood as
acceptance of and interaction with the entity by others’ (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998,
p. 214). Moreover, concerning this component, they contend, ‘recognition by
others . . . is the sine qua non of global actorhood’ (ibid., p. 215). Therefore, the ﬁrst
question for the current study is as follows: did the other actors and notably the local
and regional ones in post-independence Kosovo recognize the EULEX mission?
The second component that they deﬁne is the authority. In fact, they link authority
notably with the sense of legal competence to act. In essence, ‘authority . . . means, in
particular, the EU’s legal competence in a given subject matter’ (ibid., p. 216).
Therefore, the second question that needs to be addressed is as follows: what
was the EULEX legal competence to act (authority) in the post-independence
Kosovo?
The third component is autonomy and, according to Jupille and Caporaso (1998),
it reﬂects the institutional distinctiveness and independence of an actor from other
actors. In addition, they explain that ‘an international organization, to be an actor,
should have a distinctive institutional apparatus, even if it is grounded in, or
intermingles with, domestic political institutions’ (ibid., p. 217). The idea of
autonomy is similar to the feature of opportunities for the EU actorness developed by
Bretherton and Vogler (1999, 2006). Thus, Bretherton and Vogler (1999) claim,
concerning the opportunities of EU actorness, ‘opportunity-encapsulates factors in
the external environment which enable or constrain actorness’ (Bretherton and
Vogler 1999, 5). In their later study Bretherton and Vogler (2006, p. 24) point out
that ‘opportunity denotes the external environment of ideas and events – the context
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which frames and shapes EU action or inaction’. Consequently, in the current study,
the above discussion and notably the idea of autonomy and/or opportunities raises the
following question: does the EULEX mission have an institutional distinctiveness
separate from other involved actors in post-independence Kosovo, and what are the
EULEX opportunities in this context?
The last component for the capacity of an actor in global politics is cohesion,
which means the degree to which an entity can formulate and articulate internally
consistent policy preferences. In this context, Jupille and Caporaso (1998) identify
four separate dimensions or forms of cohesion: value (goal) cohesion, tactical
cohesion, procedural cohesion and output cohesion. According to Jupille and
Caporaso (1998, p. 219) ‘value cohesion simply refers to the similarity or
compatibility of basic goals’. In addition, ‘if goals are somewhat diﬀerent but can
be made to ﬁt with one another . . . , we speak of tactical cohesion’ (ibid., p. 219). In
contrast, ‘procedural cohesion implies some consensus on the rules and procedures
used to process issues where conﬂict exists’ (ibid.).
The ﬁnal dimension or level of cohesion is the output cohesion. This suggests that ‘if
member states succeed in formulating policies, . . . more cohesion is said to
exist . . . [and] output cohesion will be aﬀected by the level of agreement on goals
and procedures as well as the degree to which it is possible to link issues tactically’
(ibid., p. 220). Finally, Jupille and Caporaso note the fact that both horizontal
conﬂicts (those at a given level of authority) and vertical conﬂicts (those across levels)
might undermine all these forms of cohesion. By horizontal conﬂicts, they refer to
disagreements between member states and disagreements between EU-level institu-
tions. In contrast, by vertical conﬂicts they refer to the conﬂicts ‘between the EU level
and the member states, although national–sub-national conﬂicts are not excluded’
(Jupille & Caporaso, 1998, p. 220). To this end, they conclude that where such
conﬂicts are present, the EU is less able to act. In fact, this is closely related to the
argument of Holland (1995, p. 557) that the lack of a clear central authority and
sometimes divergent interests between national and European interests create
diﬃculties in EU actorness. The subsequent question that needs addressing is as
follows: what was the level or the form of EU cohesion on EULEX in post-
independence Kosovo? In brief, according to Jupille and Caporaso (1998, p. 214) ‘the
EU’s capacity to act, then, is a function of its recognition by others as well as its
authority, autonomy and cohesion’. This conclusion is also similar to the Hill’s (1993)
idea of the ‘capability-expectation gap’ on the EU actorness: that ‘it was intended to
provide a yardstick by which the process of change in European foreign policy might
be measured’ (Hill, 1998, 18).
To sum up the above discussion, the following four questions have been identiﬁed,
as key to the analysis:
1. Did the other actors and notably local and regional actors in post-independence
Kosovo recognize the EULEX mission?
2. What was the EULEX legal competence to act (authority) in the post-
independence Kosovo?
3. Does the EULEX mission have an institutional distinctiveness (autonomy)
separate from the contribution of other involved actors in post-independence
Kosovo, and what are the EULEX opportunities in this context?
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4. What is the level or the form of EU cohesion on EULEX in post-independence
Kosovo?
The answers to these questions should elucidate the overall ability of the EU to
function or not as a consistent actor in Kosovo.
III. First Reference of EULEX Mission in Kosovo: Ahtisaari’s Proposal
After more than six years of international administration by UNMIK in Kosovo, the
international community agreed to open the issue of the future political status of
Kosovo. In essence, the Contact Group, an informal grouping of six countries (USA,
Russia, United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy) in the second part of 2005,
agreed to open the issue of the future political status of Kosovo.
Subsequent to this, on 14 November 2005 the UN Secretary General appointed
Marti Ahtisaari as the Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations
for the process regarding Kosovo’s future status (UNOSEK, 2007a). Additionally,
he had the support of his deputy appointed by the UN and two deputies appointed
by the EU and US respectively. In practice, the mandate of the Special Envoy
consisted of facilitating the negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade that took
place in Vienna for around 14 months (November 2005–March 2007). The Oﬃce of
Special Envoy arranged several meetings between the Pristina and Belgrade teams,
covering a variety of issues, from decentralization and cultural heritage to the issue
of minority rights and the future political status of Kosovo. Afterwards, in March
2007, the Special Envoy reached the conclusion that the potential for negotiations
had been exhausted and further negotiations would not change the position of any of
the parties on the future status of Kosovo. Consequently, he decided to back a
proposal based on the negotiations which took place during the Vienna process.
Afterwards, he submitted a comprehensive proposal on the status issue to the
Secretary General of the UN and respective parties in Pristina and Belgrade. He
suggested independence for Kosovo with temporary international supervision.
In addition, as Pond (2008, p. 99) suggests, ‘the heart of this plan, laid down in
more than 90 percent of its provisions, consisted of protection of minority (Serb)
rights, over proportional minority seats in parliament, and other positive political
discrimination, all to be guaranteed by EU supervision’. For instance, the Serbian
language is an oﬃcial language in the entire territory of Kosovo and enjoys the same
level of legitimacy as the Albanian language, regardless of the fact that the Serb
minority represents only 8% of the whole population of Kosovo. The Kosovo
Assembly consists of 120 Members of Parliament in total. Of this number, 20 seats
are automatically apportioned to minority representatives prior to and completely
outside of the electoral process. Additional seats in the Kosovo parliament can be
acquired by the minority through electoral participation. In other words, in
Kosovo – a country with a substantive majority of 90% Albanians – the Parliament
could potentially have representation by the minority communities of up to 30–35
%, which is a clear sign of positive discrimination. Similarly, Ahtisaari’s proposal
suggested that new municipalities would be created (and this has since happened
successfully , excluding Northern Mitrovica municipality) through the decentraliza-
tion process to accommodate the Serb community in diﬀerent parts of Kosovo.
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Additionally, Ahtisaari’s proposal covered the structure of the future international
presence in Kosovo, including here the ESDP mission (EULEX) in the ﬁeld of the
rule of law.
However, only the Pristina authorities accepted the proposal presented by the
Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General; the Belgrade authorities rejected the
proposal, relying on Russian support. The permanent members of the UN Security
Council had diﬀerent views over the issue at stake. On the one side, the US, the UK
and France supported the proposal and, on the other, Russia threatened to veto the
proposal with China responding in an ambivalent manner. Therefore, after several
months of discussions the permanent members of the council failed to reach an
agreement on this issue. Nevertheless, they did agree to begin a follow-up process.
Consequently, they supported the Secretary General of the UN to appoint a troika
of the ‘US–EU–Russia’ delegation that would conduct additional negotiations
between the parties for a period of 120 days. To this end, the follow-up process of
negotiations started in August 2007. Then, at the end of their mission the ‘troika’
concluded that ‘after 120 days of intensive negotiations, however, the parties were
unable to reach an agreement on Kosovo’s status’ (Report of the Troika, 2007, p. 3).
Following this failure of the troika, there was no impetus to bring back the
possibility of putting the issue before the UN Security Council again, considering the
fact that the permanent members of the UN Security Council had not changed their
views.
In addition, the Special Envoy pointed out in his report that ‘resolution of this
fundamental issue is urgently needed’ (UNOSEK, 2007c, p.2); the international
community, notably the US and the majority of the EU member states, in
cooperation with the Kosovo government decided to proceed through a diﬀerent
channel. The Kosovo government (elected in the parliamentary elections of
November 2007) in coordination with the western countries (US and majority EU
member states) decided to declare Kosovo’s independence on 17 February 2008.
Subsequently, the United States, the majority of the EU member states and other
western democracies quickly recognized Kosovo’s independence. It should be noted
that this coordinated declaration of independence reﬂected full compliance with the
Comprehensive Proposal of Mr. Ahtisaari.
The EU’s statement of its oﬃcial position regarding the Kosovo declaration of
independence noted that ‘member states will decide, in accordance with national
practice and international law, on their relations with Kosovo’ (Council of the EU,
2008d). Nonetheless, as the subsequent developments proved and as Weller (2008, p.
74) correctly points out, ‘in reality, however, the statement only conﬁrmed the
inability of the EU to act as a uniﬁed entity in the matter of recognition’. According
to the deﬁnitions of Jupille and Caporaso (1998) on the issue of cohesion, at this
point cohesion between EU member states existed merely as procedural cohesion. In
essence, they reached some consensus on the rules and procedures to be followed on
the issue of Kosovo’s independence, whereas clearly the ‘horizontal conﬂicts’ which
exist continued to take precedence, preventing the EU from taking a more
substantive cohesive stance. In this respect, problems included division between EU
member states on the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on
the case of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. On the one side, the majority of
the EU member states that did recognize Kosovo as an independent country
EU Actorness in International Aﬀairs 289
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submitted their declarations in support of Kosovo at the ICJ. In contrast, the four
out of ﬁve member states that did not recognize Kosovo – Cyprus, Spain, Romania
and Slovakia – submitted their statements at the ICJ against Kosovo’s independence,
and Greece remained neutral at this point.
The above discussion elucidates the powerful ‘horizontal conﬂicts’ that existed and
do exist with regard to Kosovo’s independence. In addition, it clariﬁes that the ﬁrst
reference of the EULEX mission is Ahtisaari’s proposal. This also highlights the fact
that EULEX was meant to be a status-committed mission (in line with Kosovo’s
independence) and not a neutral-oriented mission, as it were, for the time being. In
spite of this fact, and as the subsequent sections will explore, the process of launching
and more particularly deploying the EULEX mission in Kosovo became more
complex and diﬃcult than was initially anticipated.
III.1 Launching the EULEX Mission in Kosovo: EU Cohesion on EULEX
To begin with, it is worth noting the plans for the EU presence in post-independence
Kosovo. The following are the three main EU entities which were planned to be
deployed in post-independence Kosovo:
1) A political entity in an International Civilian Oﬃce/European Union Special
Representative (ICO/EUSR), that will oversee a settlement;
2) An operational entity in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
mission, that will support the Kosovo authorities in the area of Rule of Law;
3) A reform driving entity in the European Commission oﬃce that will assist
Kosovo in its long-term reform eﬀorts, economic development, and assist in
fostering Kosovo’s regional integration and help it realize its EU perspective.
(ICO, 2007, p. 3)
Additionally, it was planned that the international military presence of the KFOR
would continue in Kosovo. The ﬁrst and the second entity of the above structure
were also in full compliance with the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status
Settlement (see further UNOSEK, 2007b, pp 52–58). Even so, the third entity – the
European Commission – was present before the status resolution in Kosovo, and
had to absorb the workload of the European Agency for Reconstruction.
Furthermore, an intention existed to transform the EC liaison oﬃce in Kosovo
into the EC delegation, as is the case with EC delegations elsewhere in the world. In
spite of this intention, because of the lack of consensus/cohesion between EU
member states on the independence issue, this became an impossible mission, at least
for the time being. Regarding a full deployment of the ICO, a ‘modus operandi’
found the diﬃculty rested with deployment of the EULEX mission. Hence, the full
deployment of ICO turned out to be easier, since the small ICO planning team in
Kosovo was transformed into the future International Civilian Oﬃce.
Consequently, a group of states that recognized Kosovo’s independence, dubbed
the International Steering Group (ISG),1 appointed the ﬁrst International Civilian
Representative (ICR) in Kosovo, Mr. Pieter Feith, on 28 February 2008. Similarly,
‘the ISG charged the ICR, and through him the ICO, . . . of ensuring implementa-
tion by the Government of Kosovo of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo
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Status Settlement’ (ICO, 2008). In this respect, ‘Pieter Feith was appointed European
Union Special Representative (EUSR) in Kosovo on 4 February 2008’ (Council of
the EU, 2008a).
The mandate of EUSR in Kosovo ‘includes oﬀering the EU’s advice and support
in the political process and promoting overall EU political coordination in Kosovo’
(EU Factsheet, 2008, p. 3). Moreover, ‘the EUSR will be in the lead
for . . . implementing a settlement deﬁning Kosovo’s future status, with the aim of
a stable, viable, peaceful democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo’ (ibid.).
The situation regarding EULEX appeared to be more complex. In essence, the
process started, with a Joint Action dated 4 February 2008, stating ‘the Council has
decided to launch the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo – ‘‘EULEX
Kosovo’’’ (Council of the EU, 2008b). Its mission statement was as follows:
EULEX KOSOVO shall assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and
law enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and
accountability and in further developing and strengthening an independent
multi-ethnic justice system and multi-ethnic police and customs service,
ensuring that these institutions are free from political interference and
adhering to internationally recognized standards and European best practices.
(Ibid.)
The initial Council Joint Action on EULEX was amended and the only substantial
change was an increase of ﬁnancial means for the mission in order to cover its
expenditures more eﬃciently (Council of the EU, 2009). Similarly, on 7 February
2008, ‘Mr. Yves de Kermabon . . . appointed Head of Mission of the European
Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO’ (Political and Security
Committee of the Council, 2008). It was planned that the ‘the mission’s operational
phase is foreseen to start after a 120-day transition period from the decision to
launch’ (Council of the EU, 2008c). Clearly, all these legal acts of the EU
institutions, in one way or another, referred to Ahtisaari’s proposal. This comprised
the complete legal infrastructure of the international presence, as shown previously,
in full compliance with Ahtisaari’s proposal.
Even though the launch of the EULEX mission encountered some diﬃculties, the
cohesion of the EU with regard to it appeared to be a procedural cohesion. In essence,
it emerged as procedural because all EU member states, with the exception of Cyprus
which remained silent, agreed on launching the EULEX mission at the time that the
EU Council Joint Action of February 2008 entered into force. However, in relation
to the EULEX actions, 22 EU member states agreed to work and strengthen the
state institutions of Kosovo and the remaining ﬁve did not recognize the
independence of Kosovo with four of them actively opposed the newest state; this
was shown in the Kosovo case at the ICJ.
In addition to the launching of EULEX by the EU institutions, the Kosovo
government, in its coordinated declaration of independence (article 5), invited the
international presence in Kosovo as follows: ‘we invite and welcome an international
civilian presence . . . , and a European Union-led rule of law mission’ (Kosovo
Assembly, 2008a). Subsequently, Kosovo’s President oﬃcially invited the interna-
tional presence in Kosovo in keeping with Ahtisaari’s proposal. Moreover, in the
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Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (Kosovo Assembly, 2008b, p. 55) it notes
that ‘the provisions of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status
Settlement dated 26 March 2007 shall take precedence over all other legal provisions
in Kosovo’. Thus the Kosovo authorities welcomed the international and the EU
presence in Kosovo. Ultimately, the authority of EULEX – or its legal competence to
act with its presence in post-independence Kosovo – has been guaranteed by the legal
and political documents already mentioned. These documents provided in a sense for
the launching of EULEX by the EU institutions. However, the deployment rather
than the launching of EULEX turned out to be the point at which the major
problems began to arise. The next section discusses the diﬃcult EULEX deployment
in Kosovo and the consequences of this process.
III.2 EULEX Deployment in Kosovo: A ‘Compromised Authority’ and ‘Ambiguous
Recognition’ of EULEX
Clearly, several obstacles existed that prevented the EU from moving forward with
the deployment of the EULEX mission throughout Kosovo. Firstly, the UN
Security Council did not reach an agreement on this issue (although the UN
Secretary General did support the Special Envoy’s proposal), and this became a
problem which hindered the deployment of EULEX in Kosovo, in accordance with
Ahtisaari’s proposal. An additional obstacle to deployment was the division between
EU member states on the issue of Kosovo’s independence. In this sense, if Kosovo’s
independence had been recognized by all EU member states then the reaction of
Russia at the UN and the position that Serbia took would have been diﬀerent. It
was, in particular, the division between EU member states which motivated Serbia
and Russia to consistently pursue their negative course of action. In addition,
UNMIK, which had the responsibility for rule of law issues, could not hand over
those responsibilities to the EULEX mission without a decision from the UN
Security Council. This further complicated and inﬂamed the situation. Similarly, the
Secretary General of the UN could not bypass the UN Security Council in the
process of reconﬁguring UNMIK, since the latter was launched in accordance with
the UN Security Council Resolution 1244/1999. The newly formed Kosovo
government, concerned about its international image, could not take any measures
or ask UNMIK to ﬁnish its mission and open the door for EULEX deployment.
This delay created a real stalemate for EULEX deployment.
This delay was also reﬂected in Brussels circles. For instance, the High
Representative of the CFSP, Javier Solana, had to take direct action on this matter
through daily contact with the Secretary General of the UN and by meeting him in
person to ‘discuss this issue . . . in Stockholm on the 29 May 2008’ (EurActiv, 2008).
A few weeks later, after this meeting, the deadlock situation on the EUELX mission
deployment appeared to be resolved according to the Report of the Secretary
General of the UN to the Security Council. It was, however, only the beginning of
the resolution process, and a very diﬃcult beginning indeed.
After a fact-ﬁnding mission by the UN peacekeeping chief Jean-Marie Guehenno
in Belgrade and Pristina, and his meetings with key leaders in both countries, the
Secretary General of the UN issued his quarterly yearly report on Kosovo. In his
June 2008 report, he highlighted ‘that the objectives of the United Nations would be
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best obtained through an enhanced operational role for the EU in the ﬁeld of the rule
of law under the UN ‘‘umbrella’’, headed by my Special Representative’ (UNMIK,
2008a, p. 4).
Subsequent to this report, two diﬀerent reactions emerged. On the one side, the
EU welcomed this report and its conclusions, while the Russian reaction was to
oppose the conclusions. The High Representative of the CFSP expressed the EU
position on the matter by welcoming the report, and stressing that the
‘reconﬁguration of the civilian presence will allow for the EULEX mission, in the
framework of the UNSC 1244, to intensify its deployment and to move towards
assuming its operational functions’ (Council of the EU, 2008e).
On the contrary, the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs of the Russian Federation (2008)
stressed that it considered as illegal any attempt to alter the international presence in
Kosovo without authorization of the UN Security Council and the approval of
Serbia and the Kosovo Serbs. The Belgrade authorities aligned with the Russian
position in this matter. Nevertheless, in spite of the rough terrain, this was the
beginning of implementation of the report, at least on the issue of physical
infrastructure. For instance, one move in this direction became the technical
agreement between UNMIK and EULEX which, as EULEX spokesperson Karin
Limdal said, ‘gives UNMIK . . . the green light for transferring assets to us’ (Balkan
Insight, 2008a). However, the rejection by Serbia and Russia of the mandate for the
full operational deployment of the EULEX mission remained a problem.
Negotiations between the parties involved in the process continued, as is evidenced
by the following statement made by the High Representative of the CFSP, Javier
Solana. In November 2008 Solana claimed, ‘in Kosovo our top priority is the
deployment of EULEX throughout the territory of Kosovo . . . [and] we have a very
intense dialogue with Belgrade’ (EU at UN, 2008).
Because of this intense dialogue in October 2008, the Belgrade authorities
underlined three conditions for their support of EULEX:
First, the plan must be approved by the UN Security Council. Second, it must
be neutral regarding Kosovo’s status. And, third, it must take no measures to
implement the proposal of former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, which
are regarded by Belgrade as the basis of Kosovo’s independence bid. (Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2008)
Belgrade also pushed for the implementation of the so-called ‘six-point plan’
agreed to by the Belgrade authorities and the cabinet of the UN Secretary General.
In essence, these three conditions of Serbia and the ‘six-point plan’ related to the
intentions of Belgrade to continue promoting confusion over the status of Kosovo
and to try and delay full international recognition of Kosovo’s independence as long
as possible. The lack of consensus between EU member states on Kosovo’s
independence again appeared to be the factor that Belgrade authorities used and are
still using.
The ‘six-point plan’ covered the following issues: Police, Customs, Justice,
Transportation and Infrastructure, Boundaries and Serbian Patrimony (UNMIK,
2008b, pp. 8–11). Essentially, all these six issues were resolved by Ahtisaari’s
proposal on the status issue. As a reaction, Kosovo authorities compiled
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a ‘four-point plan’ in which they rejected the ‘six-point plan’. Additionally, the ‘four-
point plan’ recalls EULEX to deploy as planned under Ahtisaari’s proposal,
Kosovo’s Constitution and Declaration of Independence, the invitation by Kosovo’s
institutions and the EU Council Joint Action.
Afterwards, faced with this situation, the UN Secretary General sought to ﬁnd a
compromise between parties. He added as an annex to his report (November 2008)
the ‘four-point plan’ of the Kosovo authorities (the Serbian ‘six-point plan’ had
already been included in his report). Consequently, with a Presidential Statement,
the UN Security Council ﬁnalized the deal for UNMIK reconﬁguration and EULEX
deployment. This also happened to be the last legal act, despite those mentioned
above, that established EULEX’s authority or legal competence to act in Kosovo.
Following this agreement, the EU French Presidency (November 2008) issued a
statement clarifying that ‘in the implementation of its mandate, the EULEX Kosovo
mission will fully respect UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999) and will operate . . . within
the status neutral framework of the UN’. This agreement opened the door for
EULEX deployment in the entire territory of Kosovo, including the problematic
area of northern Kosovo, on 9 December 2008. This has also been stressed by the
EULEX spokesperson, Victor Reuter, who claimed that ‘[EULEX oﬃcials] are out
taking their posts . . . going to police stations, court and the border’ (MINA
Breaking News, 2008). In essence, EULEX deployment in the entire territory of
Kosovo and the procedural cohesion for the mission by the EU member states
appeared at last to be a success story. On 6 April 2009, EULEX assumed full
operational capability.
However, the ambiguity that followed the EULEX deployment and its
compromised founding approach and authority turned out to have negative
implications for the further contribution of the mission in terms of its recognition.
Thus, as Shepherd (2009, p. 526) points out, ‘for Pristina, EULEX is working in line
with its March 2008 mandate to work towards the Ahtisaari plan, respecting
Kosovo’s constitution’. In contrast, ‘for Belgrade, the deployment was made possible
by a reconﬁguration of UNMIK, which sees EULEX as status-neutral, deployed
under UN auspices and not entitled to implement the Ahtisaari plan’ (ibid., pp. 526–
527). This is an ‘ambiguous recognition’ of the EULEX mission by the various
diﬀerent actors. At the same time, this is the last stage of the implementation of
EULEX recognition by all actors in Kosovo. Nonetheless, as suggested, this
ambiguous recognition from various actors cannot be considered a positive outcome.
This problem of ambiguous recognition had implications for the daily work of
EULEX as well. For instance, in the documents of EULEX, the use of double
denominators is currently a standard approach that reﬂects its status-neutral
perspective. For example, the use of both terms – border/boundary – is reﬂected in
the EULEX Programme Report (EULEX, 2009c) as well as in the EULEX Protocol
with Serbia in Policing Issues. EULEX has also changed its procedural terms, i.e.,
EULEX needs to provide quarterly reports to the UN Secretary General. This had
not been originally planned at the beginning of the mission with Ahtisaari’s proposal
or even with the EU Council Joint Action. However, this is again a reﬂection of
ambiguous recognition, and its links with the ‘UN umbrella’. Furthermore, to some
extent, this ambiguous recognition on the EULEX deployment generated confusion
even among the EULEX oﬃcials. For instance, the head of the EULEX, noted that
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‘EULEX, is technical in nature and will not get involved in matters of Kosovo’s
status’ (Balkan Insight, 2008b). Moreover, he added, ‘the legal basis of the mission is
joint action, a document which 27 member states of the EU accepted, also includes
states that did not recognize Kosovo’s independence’ (ibid.). Even so, the reality
implies that in each of the ﬁelds of its activities EULEX has to carry out certain laws.
Considering the fact that EULEX has to implement laws, this implies the
implementation of either Kosovo laws or former UNMIK regulations. This has
political implications and illustrates the fact that Kosovo’s status inﬂuences the
EULEX input and therefore it cannot be claimed that EULEX is simply a technical
mission.
Likewise, while interviewing EULEX oﬃcials in Pristina the author of this article
found these oﬃcials expressed ambiguity and confusion on the status of their
mission. Thus, some of the oﬃcials claimed that EULEX works under Resolution
1244 of the UN, while others suggested that the mission recognizes the reality in
Kosovo and works based on the Joint Action of the EU Council (4 February 2008)
and Ahtisaari’s proposal. In addition, a third group held the opinion that the
EULEX mandate is in between Resolution 1244 and Ahtisaari’s proposal for
independence. Similarly, from the citizen’s point of view, the confused manner of the
EULEX deployment cast a negative reﬂection on its image. For instance, in Pristina
immediately after the approval by the Secretary General of the UN report on this
matter, huge demonstrations took place against this plan and notably against the
‘six-point plan’. In essence, a majority of the people of Kosovo perceived
international policy on the issue as an additional negative compromise to Serbia
from the international community. Moreover, according to the UNDP (2010) ‘Early
Warning Report’ in October 2008, only 21–22% of Kosovo citizens were satisﬁed
with or supported the EULEX mission. Therefore, it is clear that the public
perception regarding the compromises that were made during the process of the
EULEX deployment was very negative. In essence, these compromises may have
transformed the very benign aim of the mission – to help Kosovo authorities in the
ﬁeld of the rule of law – into something perceived by the public in a negative light.
Thus, it can be assumed that EULEX to some extent became a ‘hostage’ of the
compromises agreed upon by those who launched the mission.
IV. EULEX Autonomy in Kosovo
The last component of the conceptual framework of this article is the issue of
autonomy. Before considering the issue of autonomy, it is important to discuss
some basic facts on EULEX per se. In essence, the EULEX mission consists of the
EU member states (excluding Cyprus), Canada, Croatia, Norway, Switzerland,
Turkey and the United States. The EULEX mission is supposedly an EU mission
in the ﬁeld of the rule of law and yet non-EU member states are part of this
mission. The EULEX mission consists in total of 2900 staﬀ members. Of these,
1700 staﬀ members are internationals and 1200 are locally recruited (EULEX,
2010a).
However, concerning the issue of EULEX autonomy, it should be pointed out that
this issue is related to EULEX relationships with other international actors, notably
with UNMIK and other EU entities present in Kosovo.
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IV.1 EULEX vs. UNMIK
In essence, the relationship between UNMIK and EULEX has been notable with
regard to the issue of the transfer of power and ﬁles from UNMIK to EULEX in the
ﬁeld of the rule of law. This process of transfer from UNMIK to EULEX took place
on the initial operational day of EULEX – 9 December 2008. According to the
EULEX report delivered to the UN on 17 June 2009, the handover of case ﬁles from
UNMIK to EULEX was successfully completed. Moreover, this report (EULEX,
2009a) indicated that EULEX conducted initial investigations for some of the
priority cases (ﬁles) transferred from UNMIK. Similarly, in terms of matters of
justice, this report (ibid.), asserts that there was a handover of approximately 300
cases to the EULEX judges and prosecutors from their UNMIK counterparts. In
fact, several oﬃcials who were interviewed for this article conﬁrmed having observed
a cooperative and smooth transfer from UNMIK to EULEX. The same smooth
transfer of power from UNMIK to EULEX was also reported in the customs
component of the EULEX mandate.
A further interesting factor on the ‘transfer’ from UNMIK to EULEX is the issue
of staﬀ. In spite of the very cooperative transfer of power and ﬁles from UNMIK to
EULEX, unfortunately in a rather cynical manner UNMIK also transferred some of
its staﬀ. According to some EULEX oﬃcials, in June of 2009 there were still 300
former UNMIK police oﬃcers within the EULEX mission.
In brief, the discussion so far highlights that the transfer of power and ﬁles from
UNMIK to EULEX happened in an eﬃcient and cooperative manner. Although
UNMIK had been an obstacle for the EULEX before its deployment, UNMIK did
not attempt to hinder the transfer of power at the time of the actual deployment of
the EULEX mission.
In contrast, there are some overlaps between UNMIK (speciﬁcally the SRSG2)
and the EUSR. Thus, considering the fact that the EUSR, as mentioned, represents
and promotes the political coordination of all EU agencies in Kosovo, it can be said
that there is some overlap between UNMIK and the EU presence in Kosovo,
although the EU is not directly linked with EULEX. Moreover, considering the fact
that the role of the SRSG nowadays remains a symbolic one, this issue does not have
any substantial implications for the daily work of EULEX.
IV.2 EULEX and other EU Entities in Kosovo
In this respect, as highlighted earlier, the division of labour between EU agencies in
post-independence Kosovo appears to be very clear. In fact, three EU entities are in
place in post-independence Kosovo, each of them with separate tasks. The
interviewees from the three main EU entities in Pristina and their counterparts in
Brussels conﬁrmed the ﬁnding of clear mandates for each of these three entities.
However, there are still challenges remaining with their work. For instance, EULEX
is the largest mission of the ESDP, and the EU had no such experience in the past.
Consequently, this causes some problems with internal communication. Another
challenge facing the EU contingent is that the EU agencies in Kosovo report to
diﬀerent EU institutions in Brussels, and this causes additional problems for their
coordination and for the eﬃcient functioning of the EU in general in Kosovo.
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This might sometimes be interpreted as suggesting that Europe cannot speak with
one voice in Kosovo. A particularly diﬃcult challenge remains regarding the double-
hatted nature of the International Civilian Representative/EU Special Representa-
tive. Thus, the ICR (EUSR) represents countries that have recognized Kosovo’s
independence, and also represents the EU as a whole, including the member states
that did not recognize Kosovo’s independence. In essence, this creates a great deal of
confusion. When this representative speaks as the ICR he is status-committed, in line
with Kosovo’s independence. But when he assumes his role as the EUSR he must
speak as a status-neutral representative. This is a reﬂection of the division between
EU member states on the recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Therefore, the
EULEX autonomy as deﬁned by Caporaso and Jupille (1998) ‘as institutional
distinctiveness and independence from other actors’ is well established in Kosovo,
with one exception. Clearly, this exception has to do with the double-hatted ICR/
EUSR; however, it is important to note that this does not involve EULEX directly,
as has been previously explained.
In brief, the four components of an actor capacity in global politics as deﬁned by
Caporaso and Jupille (1998) (recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion), in the
current study, might be regarded as follows: EULEX had a clear autonomy and
authority (although a compromised one) to act in Kosovo. Consequently, the
compromised authority from the report of the UN Secretary General generated an
ambiguous recognition by relevant factors involved in the process (Pristina and
Belgrade). Finally, the level of EU cohesion on EULEX became procedural cohesion,
and the EU division on the issue of Kosovo’s independence had negative
implications in this respect.
Bearing in mind these ﬁndings, it might be concluded that EULEX has a
handicapped capacity to act as a consistent actor in Kosovo. Hence, in this line of
argument, the section below will show how this handicapped actorness has already
been reﬂected in the very beginnings of the EULEX mission, and explore what could
be the implications for future prospects as a result.
V. EULEX in Kosovo: First Results and Failures
In essence, the EU started initial EULEX operational capability on 9 December
2008. The period until April 2009 (linked to the period at which EULEX appeared to
be a fully deployed mission) essentially served as a transitional period for the transfer
of power from UNMIK to EULEX. The real input of EULEX in Kosovo cannot be
assessed earlier than from April 2009 and onwards. Certainly, this is not a long
period of assessment for a mission of the magnitude, complexity and importance of
EULEX. However, some initial points can be made and possible future prospects
can be inferred. This is most notably true with regard to the idea of handicapped
actorness.
According to the EULEX Programme Strategy (2010b, p. 1) there are six overall
aims which EULEX intends to achieve in helping Kosovo with rule of law
institutions: 1. progress toward sustainability; 2. progress toward accountability; 3.
multi-ethnic organization; 4. freedom from political interference; 5. recognized
standards; 6. European best practices. These aims have been established with the
long-term prospect of Kosovo’s potential for possible accession to the EU.
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In order to achieve these objectives, EULEX has identiﬁed two additional
principles. The ﬁrst of these is the working technique of Monitoring, Mentoring and
Advising (MMA) Kosovo institutions in the ﬁeld of the rule of law. The second
principle is that Kosovo institutions are to be in the drivers’ seat. The key to
implanting this important concept is local ownership and accountability. Never-
theless, this has not turned out to be the case in practice in northern Kosovo.
Somehow in northern Kosovo EULEX remains authorized to do the job which
should be under the direction of Kosovo authorities. However, what are the EULEX
results in achieving its objectives until recently?
In addition to the confusion that handicapped actorness has generated in the daily
functioning of EULEX, and EULEX oﬃcials as well, handicapped actorness has
been similarly reﬂected in the initial results of EULEX. In essence, the handicapped
actorness of EULEX had a negative impact on its initial results. Three examples are
given below to illustrate this negative impact on the results related to the areas that
EULEX covers in Kosovo: customs, police and justice.
The prime example has been the failure of EULEX to install operational customs
to collect taxes in the northern part of Kosovo. In spite of the fact that one of the
reasons for delaying EULEX deployment in Kosovo was the importance of
deploying in the entire territory of Kosovo, which was accomplished, EULEX failed
to introduce functional customs in northern Kosovo. Because of this failure, as
mentioned in the Progress Report of the European Commission on Kosovo
(Commission of the EC, 2008, p. 36), ‘since the destruction of the two border posts in
northern Kosovo in February, smuggling activities have increased’. Clearly, this
situation has a negative implication for the Kosovo budget, since it implies a
substantial loss of revenues for Kosovo.
The reason behind this EULEX failure is that operational and functional customs
in northern Kosovo have been perceived by Serbia and the Serbs of northern
Kosovo as evidence of implementation of Ahtisaari’s proposal for independence.
This illustrates the handicapped actorness of the EULEX mission in Kosovo and its
negative consequences.
The second example is related to the police component of the EULEX. In essence,
it is closely linked to the EULEX failure to get approval from the Kosovo authorities
and citizens for the arranged and signed ‘Protocol of cooperation on policing issues’
with the Serbian authorities. In contrast, there is strong support from the Belgrade
authorities. The rationale behind the rejection of this protocol of cooperation by the
Kosovo authorities is that this protocol is seen to be in accordance with Serbia’s ‘six-
point plan’. In addition, this protocol triggered huge demonstrations in Pristina.
This also exempliﬁes an additional problem, and a kind of policy of double
standards. For instance, EULEX can to some extent impose its decision (e.g. the
issue of the protocol with Serbia) on the Kosovo authorities and the majority of
people in Kosovo. In contrast, it cannot install functional and eﬃcient customs in
the northern part of Kosovo. This further elucidates the problems that are caused as
a result of the handicapped actorness of the EULEX in Kosovo.
The third example is chieﬂy related to the justice sector in Kosovo. In fact,
immediately after the declaration of independence followed by the Serb riots in
northern Kosovo, the judicial system in this part of Kosovo became essentially non-
functional. The EULEX attempted to re-establish a working judicial system by
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initiating processes through a local court in Mitrovica, but it failed. In essence, the
argument behind this failure is that Serbian judges aimed to carry out their work
based on Serbian laws and Albanian judges aimed to implement the Kosovo law. In
other words, the issue is purely political and the EULEX appeared impotent to
resolve this. This example of failure regarding implementation of continuity in the
justice sector is yet another major problem resulting from the handicapped actorness
of the EULEX.
Conversely, the EULEX has obtained some positive results. For instance, ‘EULEX
closely monitored the reintegration into the Kosovo Police of 318 suspended Kosovo
Serb police oﬃcers . . . and discussed with the Kosovo authorities the re-employment
of approximately 60 Kosovo Serb correctional oﬃcers’ (EULEX, 2009b). Moreover,
‘EULEX judges presided in numerous trials, including several ethnically motivated
and war crime trials’ (ibid.). Furthermore, some progress has been achieved in
advising Kosovo rule of law institutions in general, but this is still not in line with the
expectations of Kosovo’s people and perhaps the EULEX oﬃcials per se.
In brief, the handicapped actorness of EULEX has had a negative impact on its
inﬂuence and eﬀectiveness in Kosovo. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen if the
handicapped actorness of the EULEX will continue to be an obstacle to its ability to
meet the goals of its mission for Kosovo in the future.
VI. Conclusions
This article has pointed out several important aspects of the EU’s rule of law mission
in Kosovo, dubbed EULEX Kosovo. The ﬁrst part addressed the conceptual
framework and identiﬁed four issues related to EULEX actorness in Kosovo:
recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion.
The second part focused on the EULEX background based on Ahtisaari’s
proposal. Additionally, it discussed the launch of EULEX and the issue of EU
cohesion with respect to this. The following part covered the diﬃcult process of
EULEX deployment, which ended up with a compromised authority and ambiguous
recognition of the mission itself. The article went on to stress the relations of EULEX
with other international actors and EU entities involved in Kosovo and how this
relates to the issue of autonomy. Finally, the last part discussed the very ﬁrst results
and failures of EULEX in the ﬁeld of the rule of law, conditioned by its handicapped
actorness.
To sum up, it could be said that EULEX has a clear authority (although a
compromised one) and autonomy to act in Kosovo. On the other hand, there is a
problem with ambiguous recognition by other actors involved in the process, i.e.
Pristina and Belgrade authorities. Regarding the level of EU cohesion on EULEX,
there has only been a procedural cohesion. This form of EU cohesion on EULEX has
been undermined by ‘horizontal conﬂicts’ as deﬁned by Jupille and Caporaso (1998).
These conﬂicts are the result of deep-seated disagreements between EU member
states on Kosovo’s independence. Furthermore, in this respect, Jupille and Caporaso
(1998) underline that where such conﬂicts are present the EU is less able to act
eﬀectively.
Therefore, as a reﬂection of the ﬁndings on the issues of authority, autonomy,
ambiguous recognition, cohesion and ‘horizontal conﬂicts’ of the EU on Kosovo’s
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independence, it can be concluded that the EULEX had and is having a ‘limited
capacity’ and is less able to act consistently in Kosovo. This situation also had a
negative impact on the ﬁrst input of EULEX in Kosovo. In addition, but only, to
some extent, as it appeared from the empirical ﬁndings, this situation is a reﬂection
of constellations of power politics in international relations. Nonetheless, as pointed
out, if the ‘horizontal conﬂicts’ between EU member states had not existed, the
implications of international power politics on the EULEX mission might have been
less signiﬁcant than they turned out to be into practice.
Notwithstanding, if the EU intends to have a successful mission in the ﬁeld of the
rule of law in Kosovo, and consequently to make Kosovo a viable and self-
sustaining state, it needs to take the following three steps:
First, the EU should try and resolve its ‘horizontal conﬂicts’, i.e. to speak with one
voice, even though, as the literature review at the beginning of this article underlined,
this is always a diﬃcult task for the EU. In this case, this involves the process of
convincing the last ﬁve members of the club to recognize Kosovo’s independence. In
this context, the ICJ ruling on Kosovo’s independence, which stated clearly that
Kosovo’s independence does not violate international law, should be an additional
argument for encouraging the important move of the last ﬁve EU member states to
recognize Kosovo’s independence.
Second, the EU should attempt to prevent Serbia from interfering in the internal
issues of Kosovo, using the mechanisms of ‘stick and carrot’ in traditional European
integration processes.
Third, at the point that the EU ﬁnally speaks with one voice, it should strengthen
political support for the EULEX mission and make it more eﬀective and eﬃcient. In
other words, after the ﬁrst and second steps are complete, EULEX needs to change
its stance from a status-neutral mission and take on the signiﬁcant increase in
responsibility necessary to become a status-committed mission. In this context, the
timing has a great deal of importance. In essence, if this does not happen soon and
the EULEX continues to be ineﬃcient and ineﬀective, its image may suﬀer
irreversible damage leading to permanent failures from which it cannot recover.
Consequently, it is crucial to the EULEX mission that there is no further
degradation of the trust of the people of Kosovo toward the EULEX mission, as
this could potentially reduce any prospects for the EULEX mission per se.
Nevertheless, bearing in mind the facts below, it should be expected that the EU
decision-makers would not allow the failure of EULEX in Kosovo:
a) The Kosovo intervention in 1999 in some way appeared to be an addi-
tional factor or stimuli for the EU decision-makers to create the ESDP and to
appoint for the ﬁrst time the High Representative of the CFSP. In other words,
even in symbolic terms, EULEX failure in a place that at least had some
symbolic importance for the ESDP creation; it is not a good sign for the EU.
b) The intervention in Kosovo in 1999 also, to some extent, returned the attention
of the international community, and notably of the EU, to the western Balkan
countries.
c) Finally, considering the fact that EULEX Kosovo is the biggest mission of the
ESDP, if this mission fails it will not send a positive signal for the smaller ESDP
missions deployed elsewhere in the world.
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It remains to be seen if the EU has learned its lessons from the past. Nevertheless,
a EULEX failure in Kosovo would be a failure of the European project in Kosovo,
and potentially in the entire region of the western Balkans.
Consequently, this should be an alert to the EU decision-makers, and notably to
those member states that refuse to recognize Kosovo’s independence. Clearly, the
time is now, because tomorrow it will be too late, for the success of the European
project in Kosovo and the wider implications for the west Balkans. Ultimately, the
success or failure in the case of the EULEX and Kosovo in general is one of the key
tests of EU actorness in international aﬀairs.
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